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Exit law, enter politics: The foundations and the 
legacy of the contested independence of Kosovo
Los fundamentos y el legado de la contestada 




The way Kosovo is achieving independence has been welcomed with antithetical opi-
nions in the international community, especially with respect to international law. This 
paper attempts to shed light on the legal trajectory which brought Kosovo on the way 
to statehood. After determining that Kosovo has not, prima facie, any positive right 
to independence, its de facto statehood is contrasted with a few doctrines that could 
contribute to support it, namely self-determination, remedial secession theory, and 
international dispositive powers. The analysis finds that Kosovo independence might 
be legally justifiable under a collective recognition theory, possibly supported with 
remedial arguments. Having further enquired over the effectiveness and the legitimacy 
of its independent status (statehood criteria), this article contends that such turn of 
developments in Kosovo is better explained through more genuine political reasoning. 
The validity of independence as a solution is not debated in itself, but on the basis of 
the whole process the negative effects of reaching such outcome by the way of a one-
sided decision are discussed.   
Keywords: Kosovo, Secession, Independence, International Law, International Rela-
tions, Statehood Criteria.
Resumen
La manera en que Kosovo está a punto de obtener la independencia fue acogida con 
opiniones antitéticas en la comunidad internacional, en particular con respecto al dere-
cho internacional. Este artículo tiene como reto aclarar la trayectoria jurídica que ha 
llevado Kosovo camino a la estatalidad. Tras determinar que Kosovo no goza, prima 
facie, de un derecho positivo a la independencia, su estatalidad de facto se pone en 
contraste con unas cuantas doctrinas que podrían contribuir a soportarla, eso es, la 
autodeterminación de los pueblos, la teoría de la secesión como remedio, y los llamados 
“poderes dispositivos internacionales” (international dispositive powers). El análisis 
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halla que la independencia de Kosovo podría justificarse bajo una teoría del reconoci-
miento colectivo, posiblemente reforzada con argumentos de remedio. El artículo sigue 
investigando sobre la efectividad y la legitimidad de su estatus independiente (criterios 
de estatalidad), y finalmente se sostiene la idea de que este giro de acontecimientos en 
Kosovo mejor se explica con un razonamiento más genuinamente político. La validez 
de la independencia como solución en sí misma no es discutida; en cambio, basándose 
en el intero proceso, se debaten los efectos negativos de haber llegado a tal resultado 
por medio de una decisión unilateral. 
Palabras clave: Kosovo, Secesión, Independencia, Derecho Internacional, Relaciones 
Internacionales, Criterios de Estatalidad.
Introduction
The 17 of February 2008 the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government unilaterally 
declared the formal independence of Kosovo from Serbia1. A number of countries 
immediately recognized Kosovo as a new sovereign state; but after the initial momen-
tum, due to the negative stance of its parent state, recognitions have proceeded rather 
slowly.2 The echo of these developments in the international community, anyway, does 
not seem to decrease, affecting equally states and international lawyers.3 With good 
approximation, the mixed reactions of lawyers can be said to reflect the practice of states, 
which ranges from unconditional support to resolute opposition, including an option of 
silence or neutrality. It is evident that one of the main concerns, among both supporters 
and detractors of the independence, is trying to place this fact in relation with existing 
norms of international law. The task is admittedly difficult, since in hard cases like this 
law and politics seem to be inextricably interwoven.4 The objective difficulty of legally 
framing the case of Kosovo, is coupled with the widespread feeling that many basic 
tenets of international law have been given a shake.5 An overview of international legal 
articles on the subject reveals that a few, crucial issues are of common concern: the 
legality of unilateral independence, the legitimacy of external recognition, the friction 
between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity, the fulfilment of 
the criteria for statehood, and the precedential effects of a purported sui generis solution. 
With a close eye on the legal dimension in which the Kosovo case has developed in 
recent years, this paper is focused on the process which created the conditions for -and 
which is apparently leading to- the independence of Kosovo. The purpose is trying to 
determine on what side of the legal-political balance the justifications for a unilateral 
independence weigh.  
The article consists of three main sections. Section I presents an overview of the salient 
moments in the recent political and legal history of Kosovo and is made up of four 
sub-sections. The first one shortly examines the period which goes from 1989 to 1999, 
in which the situation in Kosovo gravely deteriorated; the second indulges on the 
NATO humanitarian intervention of 1999, recalling the controversy which arose in 
the international community; the third analyses the difficulties and the ambiguities of 
the international administration period; and the last one provides some details about 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the international reactions that 
followed. Section II deals with the intricate normative dimensions of secession under 
general international law and the special regime created under the Security Coun-
1. The Albanian spelling is 
‘Kosova’; throughout this arti-
cle the English/international 
spelling is in use. 
2. With the recognition of 
Somalia (19 May 2010) the 
number of states which 
recognized Kosovo now 
amounts to 69. The recog-
nitions one year after the 
UDI (17 February 2009) were 
summing up 54.
3. Benedek (2008), at 391.
4. Borgen (2008); Jia (2009), 
at 29.
5. Hilpold (2009), at 47-48.
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cil Resolution 1244 (S/Res/1244). Having found that apparently the UDI is not in 
line with the international legal framework provided by the United Nations mission 
(UNMIK), three additional discrete legal grounds for asserting the lawfulness of the 
unilateral independence are discussed, namely: self-determination, remedial secession 
theory, and international dispositive powers. Having determined that Kosovo authorities 
have reached partial independence following to collective recognition of part of the 
international community, section III scrutinizes to what extent the secession of Kosovo 
can be deemed successful in its aim of establishing a fully independent  state. First, its 
degree of effectivité as a sovereign nation is put into relation with both traditional and 
so called additional criteria for statehood; such factual analysis either does not present 
unequivocal elements in favour of independent statehood. Secondly, it is recalled the 
role and the justifications of international supporters of Kosovo statehood in order to 
frame its secession as a fait accompli. The last subsection supports the argument that 
the independence of Kosovo has been defended by international actors on the basis of 
political rather than legal reasoning, and deals with a few detrimental effects of pushing 
for such one-sided solution. 
I. The origins of the internationalized dispute
A. The crisis of the 1990’s
Inter-ethnic clashes between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo have deep historical roots 
but aggravated in the 20th century, once Serbians consolidated their sovereignty over 
the region. With the Titoist constitution of 1974, Albanians finally attained a status 
similar to that of other Yugoslav nations and Kosovo gained prerogatives in all similar 
to the other constituent republics, left aside a full federal status. The crisis of the 1990s 
is generally imputed to the political project of Slobodan Milošević, who managed to 
capitalize on Serbian nationalism in one of the most difficult transitional periods Yugos-
lavia had to confront.  On the one hand, he had to face the growing resentment of the 
Albanian population of Kosovo (accounting for almost 90% of the total), which were 
demanding federal status (or outward independence) for their province; on the other 
hand, he had to listen to the equally increasing calls for reaction of the local Serbian 
community, whose presence had been historically threatened by acts of intimidation 
on behalf of the Albanians. On these premises, the central government decided in 
1989 to unilaterally revoke the autonomous status of Kosovo. This act was followed by 
a policy of exclusion and oppression of Albanians in all aspects of social and political 
life. Special police measures were adopted, which exposed the Albanian community to 
systematic violations of their fundamental rights, and which arguably precipitated the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Under the leadership of Rugova, Albanians started to build parallel institutions, and 
committed to avoid direct confrontation with the Serbian forces. Following the example 
of Slovenia and Croatia, which in 1992 successfully seceded from the SFRY, Kosovo 
itself declared independence from Serbia. However, despite its crystalline conflict poten-
tial, the peaceful Albanian resistance received little or no attention at the international 
level;6 it could also be contended that the Albanian resistance did not raise such atten-
tion exactly because it was perceived to be firmly advocating for outward secession. 
As a matter of fact, the European Community -by voice of the Badinter Arbitration 
Committee- in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia decided that only the consti-6. Mertus (2009), at 475. 
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tuent Republics had a right to seek international recognition, and that ethnic minorities 
had no right to external self-determination. Kosovo’s request for recognition, and the 
situation of Kosovo as a whole, was therefore not even deemed worth of consideration. 
The Dayton conference, which brokered the peace in Bosnia in 1995, confirmed the 
disregarding international attitude towards Kosovo. It was at the same time sending two 
dangerous messages to the Albanian community: first, that westerners would be more 
prone to pay attention to a violent party than to a non violent one; and secondly, as 
the creation of the Republika Srpska of Bosnia possibly testified, that the West could 
recognize territorial changes operated by force and ethnic cleansing. 
A major shift in the Albanian strategy thereafter occurred. While the personal leadership 
of Rugova started to waver, a growing section of the population felt ready to embrace 
weapons and fight for the Albanian cause. The appearance in 1996-1997 of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), which adopted the strategy of armed conflict (including terro-
rist and guerilla tactics) to challenge the Serbs, undeniably made the Serbian-Albanian 
conflict escalate, sinking all chances of peaceful resolution of the conflict. Having to 
confront now a secessionist armed  group, Serbia launched high-scale military opera-
tions, in order to sedate the rebel province. At this point the international community 
began to press for diplomatic solutions, seeking to mediate between the parties. But after 
finding allegations of mass murder of Albanians the US and European countries aban-
doned their uncertainties in favour of a more robust power stance vis-à-vis Milošević. 
The KLA, previously considered a terrorist group, became the principal interlocutor of 
Western diplomacy. Forcing the parties to convene at Rambouillet, the Western powers 
sought to impose on them conditions, which were particularly severe, especially if con-
trasted with the principle of national sovereignty.7 The predictable refusal of the Serbian 
leadership to sign the Rambouillet Accords rapidly convinced the Western leaders of 
the opportunity of a military intervention to be conveyed by NATO after opportunely 
reformulating its strategic doctrine.  
B.  Operation Allied Force 
The Operation Allied Force (OAF) is discussed somehow in detail since it did much 
to create the “unprecedented” case of Kosovo. Unable to obtain an authorization to 
proceed against Belgrade in the Security Council (SC) -due to a predictable Russian 
veto- NATO decided to initiate the military operations autonomously, under the moral 
justification of averting a humanitarian disaster. The opposition to deploy ground tro-
ops, especially in the United States, forced NATO to an aerial bombing campaign of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), with the wrong reposed idea of inducing 
Milošević to a rapid withdrawal. Furthermore, for fear of allied losses, the air strikes 
were conducted from a height of 5,000 feet, which on the one hand made difficult 
countering Serbian movements on the battlefield, and on the other hand proportionally 
increased the chances of missing or mistaking targets. 
In virtue of their unopposed control of the ground, and with the amplified internal 
support that an illegal attack to the homeland could predictably trigger, Serbian military 
and paramilitary groups intensified the operations against both the KLA and Albanian 
civilians. In order to subdue the bold Serbian attitude, NATO had to reach the third 
(and last) operational phase of the campaign, which significantly widened the range of 
possible objectives, including dual use (civil-military) facilities such as bridges, factories, 
7. The so called “Rambouillet 
Accords” were meant to 
provide Kosovo with meanin-
gful self-government, the 
withdrawal of Serbian forces 
and the deployment of a 
NATO contingent, in view of a 
final referendum on the status 
of Kosovo to be held within 
three years. These conditions 
were non-negotiable. Appen-
dix B of the document, con-
tained provisions which were 
considered –even by foreign 
commentators- unacceptable. 
Cf.  Interim Agreement for Peace 
and Self-Government in Kosovo, 
Appendix B, para. 6 – 11. 
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electric infrastructure and telecommunications. Overall, it took 78 days and thousands 
of raids -it is to add, on the whole territory of the Federal Republic- to overcome the 
regime of Milošević. The shock in Serbian society was great, and alimented a sense 
of anger towards the West which is still evident today. From a Serbian point of view, 
there was no case in the history where a sovereign state had been bombed and forced 
to withdraw from its own territory when it sought to get rid of a secessionist armed 
group. The operation -and the contemporary enlargement of NATO- contributed to 
renew tensions between Russia and the West.8
The impact of OAF on the future of Kosovo could hardly be underestimated. Even if 
we accept that ‘the creation of the state of Kosovo can only be attributed to the post-
conflict legal arrangement established by Resolution 1244’,9 it is clear that without the 
NATO intervention it would not have been possible to adopt any Security Council 
resolution; therefore others could argue that OAF had been ‘a watershed event which 
made independence before possible and then real’.10 Unsurprisingly, the campaign 
was at the heart of a harsh debate concerning its lawfulness, at least as intense as it is 
nowadays with the UDI. At the time, some scholars envisaged a sort of revolution in 
the international application of human rights standards.11 Ten years later, and despite 
further, major humanitarian crises, OAF remains a unique case, which does not suggest 
of any new customary rule in the enforcement of basic standards of human rights.12
Western internal criticism was widespread, and much differentiated. A number of 
supporters of the campaign criticized its operational rationale, arguing that OAF was 
not, and could not be, aimed at stopping violence against ethnic Albanians.13 Such a 
task could have been accomplished by a greater commitment of intervening parties, 
which had probably to include the deployment of ground troops. From a strictly legal 
standpoint, the main contention is that regional organizations, to which a defensive 
alliance like NATO could be assimilated, have an obligation -under the UN Char-
ter- to restrain from the use of force unless so allowed by the SC.14 Another stream of 
critics, came from those idealists who found hard to believe that human rights (“equal 
and inalienable”)15 can be defended when at the same time they are being violated.16 
It should be also reminded that NATO, in its history as a military alliance, never had 
human rights on its agenda. A sudden –and outlaw- humanitarian operation had to 
undertake the risks of raising serious doubts of legitimacy, which ten years later have 
not yet dissipated.17
Western countries had to mount a huge media campaign in order to secure internal 
support for war,18 which was arguably low. In some countries, the OAF engagement 
was even raising doubts of unconstitutionality.19 The “humanitarian mission” was not 
at all different from other war operations: “intelligent missiles” were not so “smart”, 
and the “collateral damage” amounted to hundreds of civilian losses on both sides. It 
is also a fact that the major humanitarian crisis (an estimate of 800.000 refugees and 
500.00 internally displaced) occurred after NATO started the air strikes. All the more, 
NATO made use of weaponry -such as cluster bombs and depleted uranium- ‘of ques-
tionable lawfulness’.20 It must finally be recalled that OAF actually paved the way for 
an Albanian backlash vengeance. During and following to the end of the operations, 
at least 200.000 among Serbs and other ethnic minorities had to flee Kosovo in fear. 
8. Cottey (2009), at 601.
9. Vidmar (2009), at 827.
10. Mertus (2009), at 476.
11. See Cassese (1999). 
12. See Hehir (2009).
13. Charney (1999), at 1237.
14. UN Charter, Art. 53.
15. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Preamble. 
16. See Gambino (2001); 
Koskenniemi (2002). 
17. It is memorable the 
discourse of President Clinton: 
‘[N]ever forget if we can do 
this here, and if we can say 
to the people of the world, 
whether you live in Africa or 
Central Europe, or any other 
place, if somebody comes 
after innocent civilians and 
tries to kill them en masse 
because of their race, their 
ethnic background or their 
religion, and it’s within our 
power to stop it, we will stop 
it’. Quoted in Hehir (2009), 
at 260.
18. Schnabel and Thakur 
(2000), at 11.
19. Convincing arguments in 
this sense may be advanced 
vis-à-vis Italy (Art.11: ‘Italy 
repudiates war as a means 
of dispute settlement’), and 
Germany (Art. 26, 1: ‘Acts 
intended to disturb peace 
shall be unconstitutional’) 
at least.
20. Falk (1999), at 851.
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Of course, that is not to say that the intervention was completely ineffective: it concre-
tely put an end to Serbian violations of human rights and practice of ethnic cleansing. 
However, NATO countries could not articulate specific and compelling legal justifica-
tions for the intervention, and questions arise on whether it was a proportionate mea-
sure, justifiable under the jus ad bellum principles. Some scholars have even doubted as 
a whole that OAF was waged on purely humanitarian grounds, pointing at concrete, 
external national interests which could have been at stake.21 Be things as they may, the 
ethical appeal of the operation remains ultimately a subjective question. The fact remains 
that, notwithstanding a diffuse political and moral endorsement, echoed in the Report 
of the Independent Commission on Kosovo,22 OAF was recognized as a plainly illegal 
act, which, due to the immensely superior potential of NATO military forces, many 
saw as a collective punishment of the Serbian population as a whole. 
C.  The UN-led post-conflict management
The day after Milošević capitulated, June 10 1999, it was possible to pass S/Res/1244 
which re-conducted the situation in Kosovo under the “UN umbrella”. At the moment, 
it was considered as a masterpiece of diplomatic efforts, having managed to break the SC 
impasse on the situation of Kosovo, but with time, it proved to be frail and flawed by 
ambiguities. In the document, the Security Council members -after expressly reaffirming 
‘the commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia’-23 established an international civil administration  which resulted to be 
a multi-task mission of high complexity. UNMIK, again with little precedent –in the 
history of UN peacekeeping missions at least- was vested with extensive powers and 
an open mandate. 
In short, the UN were assuming the burden of administering and managing the entire 
institutional structure of the territory, while at the same time ‘[p]romoting the esta-
blishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government 
in Kosovo’.24 UNMIK therefore retained all competences in matters of police, justice 
and civil administration, while security, economic development and reconstruction, 
democratization and institution building were demanded to distinct international 
bodies (respectively NATO, EU, and OSCE). Being directly under the supervision of 
the Secretary General through a Special Representative (SGSR), UNMIK concretely 
operated a shift of sovereignty, which from Serbia was passed to the UN, as in the case 
of non-self governing territories.25 Others instead argued that ‘[o]n 10 June 1999, the 
Security Council disaggregated sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo into formal 
title (left with Serbia as nudum ius), material interest (accorded to a people with “uni-
que historical, legal, cultural and linguistc attributes”) and governing power (vested 
in UNMIK)’.26 UNMIK was finally invested of the uneasy task of ‘[o]rganizing and 
overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous 
self-government’, ‘[f ]acilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future 
status’, and ‘[i]n a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s pro-
visional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement’.27 In the 
whole process, UNMIK had also to comply with a policy of neutrality with respect 
to the final status, which had to be decided -as it was mentioned- through “a political 
process” by the parties themselves. With the creation of the Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government (PISG), in 2001, UNMIK started to progressively transfer the 
authority to local actors, in order to realize a meaningful degree of self-government as 
21. O’Neill (2002), at 17.
22. Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo: The 




accessed 13/12/2009].  
23. The Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia disappeared in 
2006, after the peaceful seces-
sion of Montenegro. Serbia is 
its successor state.
24. S/Res/1244, para. 11 (a).
25. ‘UNMIK has raised taxes 
and issued stamps [...]; it has 
changed the currency and 
replaced the Serbian flag and 
all symbols of Serbia with UN 
regalia; it controls borders 
issues identity documents 
and enters into agreements 
with States’. Goodwin (2007), 
at 7.
26. Knoll (2009), at 383. 
27. S/Res/1244, para. 11 (c), 
(e) and (f ).
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envisaged by the Rambouillet Accords and by S/Res/1244 itself. The Constitutional 
Framework, under which this transfer was made possible, stated clearly that the final 
authority in Kosovo remained the SGSR, who maintained key competencies in assuring 
the full respect of S/Res/1244. 
Notwithstanding the immense efforts, the general conditions of the society in Kos-
ovo were improving slowly. Inter-ethnic relations remained tense at best. Serbs were 
concentrated in the Northern Mitrovica area, which was de facto under Belgrade’s 
authority, while in the south they were relegated in guarded enclaves, with serious res-
trictions of movement and access to facilities. The international ideal of a multi-ethnic 
Kosovo apparently was not adherent to reality: security conditions remain particularly 
tough for minority communities, Serbs and Roma especially. Acts of intimidation and 
ethnic violence have been reported throughout the past 10 years. In 2004, a series of 
coordinated violent actions in the whole Kosovo showed once more the difficulties 
which the international oversight was to face: the balance was of 19 human losses and 
massive spoil of Serbian cultural heritage. Other issues which remain problematic for 
minority members concern justice and freedom of movement. The judicial system, in 
particular, was one of the worst aspects during the international administration years. 
Ex-KLA members for years kept undermining the justice machine by the way of physical 
intimidation and targeted murders. The international administration was not spared 
from harsh critics, in particular about the extensive prerogatives and immunities of its 
officials,28 while the whole UNMIK system was referred to in terms of a Central Asian-
like absolutist regime.29 It is of course remarkable that under UNMIK and KFOR the 
security situation remained generally stable, but it is equally true that it never really 
normalized. The demilitarization of the KLA proceeded hurriedly, while their members 
either were enrolled into the Kosovo Police Service or directly entered in politics.30 All 
considered, the demilitarization of society has been another major failure of the inter-
national administration.31 
In these difficult conditions, the UN initially decided to adopt a “standards before 
status” policy, meaning that advancements in key sectors of society -such as the rule 
of law, non discrimination, democratization etc.- should have been achieved before 
entering the final status process. However, in 2005 the UN Special Envoy Kai Eide, 
remarking that improvements in standards were proceeding slowly, nonetheless urged 
to initiate the final status talks. After several rounds of negotiations in which the dia-
metrically opposed views of the parties -supported by the ambiguous wording of S/
Res/1244- could not bring to any result, and lacking again a consensus in the SC, on 
March 25 2007 the UN SGSR Martti Ahtisaari delivered its Comprehensive Proposal for 
the Kosovo Status Settlement, in which he was acknowledging that independence was ‘the 
only realistic option’, and therefore presented it as the most viable solution, even though 
‘supervised initially by the international community’.32 The Ahtisaari Plan was aimed at 
regulating all aspects of the internal life to ensure that the final status process would lead 
to statehood.33 Being the outcome of this proposal at odds with a strict interpretation 
of S/Res/1244,34 it is unsurprising that Russia blocked its endorsement in the Security 
Council. In view of the events, the document remains a proposal of high political sig-
nificance -especially if looking in hindsight- but all considered of scarce legal relevance. 
28. Among other things, the 
“Ombudsperson noted that 
the purpose of granting 
immunity to international 
organizations is to protect 
them from governmental 
interference in the territories 
there where they are based, 
and that a wide grant of 
immunity is illogical in cases 
such as Kosovo where an 
international organization ser-
ves as a governmental actor”. 
Everly (2007), at 32.
29. Maciej Zaremba, ‘Report 




future-1.732443 [last accessed 
02/12/2009].  
30. The image of a monolithic 
structure for KLA should not 
be overestimated. In the 
years 1996-1999 emerged 
several paramilitary units only 
generically pursuing the same 
objective. See Koktsidis and 
Ten Dam (2008).
31. In 2006 there were an 
estimated 400.000 weapons 
on a population of about 2 
millions. Of these, only around 
40.000 were regularly registe-
red. Forum for Civic Initiatives 
(2008). 
32. Report of the Special 
Envoy of the Secretary General 
on Kosovo’s Future Status, 
S/2007/168/Add.1 (26 March 
2007). 
33. D’Aspremont (2007), at 
658.
34. See below, Section II.B.
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D.  The UDI and the international reactions 
A final round of negotiations in Vienna, biased by the reassurance of Western coun-
tries to support the final independence of Kosovo, could not result in any agreement 
whatsoever between the parties. Therefore, as it was mentioned in the opening, when 
the Assembly of Kosovo solemnly proclaimed its independence, the new state was soon 
recognized by a conspicuous number of states, most of them gravitating in the Western 
sphere of attraction. It was hardly a mystery for anybody, since the declaration itself was 
programmed and previously agreed upon with Western chancelleries.35 Comprehensibly, 
Serbia immediately declared the UDI null and void, in an attempt of safeguarding its de 
jure sovereignty over the territory, while Russia considered it “a violation of international 
law”, letting intend that it would not tolerate Kosovo to apply for UN membership. 
Such a stance was interpreted by the Western partners of the informal mediating group 
(the Contact Group: USA, GB, France, Germany and Italy) as a sort of betrayal on 
behalf of Russia, or alternatively as a Russian over-projection into European regional 
affairs. Nonetheless, other prominent nations and emerging powers (China, India, 
Brazil) also refused to back the unilateral move to independence; equally, concerns 
about the opportunity of such one-sided solution refrained the Arab League and the 
Organization for the Islamic Conference from fostering collective recognition of Kosovo 
among their member states. 
However, of even more importance for the regional context is the fact that a sizeable 
minority of EU countries is firmly portraying the unilaterally declared independence 
as contrary to international law.36 Their arguments are slightly different (as distinct 
are the political reasons which account for their negative stance in front of other EU 
members), but all of them substantially point out that declarations of independence are 
-and should be- subject to international law, which rejects unilateral secession, except 
under extreme circumstances;37 and that, in the specific case, Kosovo authorities were 
to act within the framework of S/Res/1244, which did not provide any ground against 
the territorial integrity of former Yugoslavia. On these premises -and especially made 
strong by Russian unconditional support in the SC- Serbia managed to request the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on the legality of 8the 
UDI, which will surely shed some light on the question, and to some extent orientate 
the future course of international legal developments.38 Interestingly enough, a few 
countries which had already recognized Kosovo endorsed the motion, confirming that 
in such cases political discretion does not coincide with a position that necessarily ranks 
into international legal reasoning.39 In the while, the Assembly of Kosovo, once again 
with the support of international legal experts,40 approved the Constitution of Kosovo 
on June 15 2008. This resulted in a further complication of the legal framework of 
Kosovo. In fact, the Constitution which is normally the ultimate source of law in a 
state’s legal hierarchy, was made explicitly subject to the Status Settlement proposed 
by Ahtisaari.41 It also established that the International Civilian Representative (ICR) 
would have ample discretionary powers. Remarkably, all mentions to S/Res/1244 and 
UNMIK disappeared, evidence that the drafters of the Constitution were aware that 
the whole constitutional process was at odds with the provisions of the SC Resolution. 
Some scholars, arguably supporters of a true independence, have criticized the Consti-
tution on the basis that it ‘will largely allow international politics to dominate Kosovo’s 
future’.42 Others, even more subtly, remarked that ‘predetermining boundaries within 
35. Benedek (2008), at 397; 
Vidmar (2009), at 783 and 804. 
36. Namely Spain, Greece, Slo-
vakia, Romania, and Cyprus.
37. Section II.D, below, 
provides more details about 
remedial secession theory.
38. GA/Res/63/3, adopted on 
8 October 2008 by 77 votes 
in favour, 6 contraries, and 
74 abstained. The question 
was worded as follows: ‘Is the 
unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo in accordance with 
international law?’. 
39. Costa Rica, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
Senegal voted in favour of the 
motion, even though they 
had already recognized Koso-
vo. Montenegro also voted in 
favour: it recognized Kosovo 
the day after (9 October 2008).
40. Knoll (2009), at 381. 
41. Constitution of Kosova, Art. 
143 (2-3).
42. Vogel (2008), at 5.
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which a constitution [...] is to be framed appears designed to confiscate the right to 
internal self-determination from a freshly liberated people before they have constituted 
themselves in freedom’.43 Be things as they may, as it was mentioned the number of 
countries that recognized the present state of Kosovo has reached 69, that is, more than 
a third of the total UN members. The SC did not issue any duty of non-recognition, 
which would be expected in cases of severe breaching of peremptory norms of interna-
tional law (jus cogens). While such developments can be interpreted as an assurance that 
Kosovo has been put on a secure trajectory to statehood, it will actually remain in the 
legal limbo of partial -or de facto- statehood, which is something obvious given the tenor 
of the controversy. In such instances, external recognition remains at disposal of states 
on political or strategic grounds, in line with the declaratory theory.44 It would be mis-
leading, however, to consider the external recognitions of Kosovo as in full accordance 
with the declaratory theory. That would imply that Kosovo was already a state when it 
was recognized, while it seems more respondent to reality the fact that Kosovo was ‘to 
be constituted as a State’.45 On the basis of the prohibition of premature recognition of 
new sovereign entities, a duty of non-recognition could have been opposed to recog-
nizing states,46 but this is once more a matter left to the discretion of sovereign states. 
It seems important at this point to underline that ‘most of the States that give reasons 
for their decision have preferred to stress different political considerations without 
going into details about international law regarding the general terms and conditions of 
secession, including possible exceptions’.47 In such instance, a semi-constitutive theory 
of recognition possibly provides a more accurate explanation of the observed pheno-
menon.48 External recognitions would have been accorded in this case as a political act 
endowed with some prospective or “residual” legal effects. This is an additional proof 
of how –in this field of international relations- legal and political reasoning converge or 
overlap. However, as the ICJ stated in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
the fact that an issue keeps holding political importance does not deprive it of its legal 
nature.49 The purpose of the following section will be therefore to investigate what 
possible legal grounds can be of relevance in the instance of Kosovo’s independence. 
2. The legal grounds of the unilateral independence
A. Self-determination and territorial integrity under general international law: rele-
vance for the Kosovo case
The decade of the 90’s will remain known in history as a peak season of successful 
secession movements, which -under different conditions, for distinct reasons and by 
various means- were capable to establish new sovereign polities separating them from 
their parent states, and managed to gain full admission to the interstate community. 
Obviously, this cast renewed attention on the issue of self-determination, which since 
the end of the decolonization process had apparently become a right deprived of its 
universalistic character and with few legitimate claimants left. Since it was mentioned 
in the UN Charter,50 the principle (thereafter right) of self-determination of peoples 
has been recalled in numerous international legal documents. Its universal character was 
reaffirmed in the twin Covenants of 1966,51 but its scope and applicability was rather 
circumscribed to peoples inhabiting either an independent state or a non self-governing 
territory. In a few words, self-determination could not interfere with the fundamental 
43. Knoll (2009), at 381.
44. The declaratory theory 
considers recognition as non 
influential on the statehood 
of a prospective state. On 
the contrary, the constitutive 
theory sees external recogni-
tion as central to the process 
of acquiring statehood. 
Crawford (2006), at 19-26. 
45. Warbrick (2008), at 682.
46. Raič (2002), at 92-93.
47. Almqvist (2009), at 8.
48. Schoiswohl (2004), at 39 
and ss.
49. Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996-I), 
para. 13, at 233-234.
50. Charter of the United 
Nations, Art. 1 (2) and Art. 55.
51. International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, common Art. 1.
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rules of international order, namely state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Within 
these limits, starting from the 60’s it passed to be the legal and philosophical basis ruling 
the decolonization process that was central in the next decades.52
The majority interpretation, for the sake of self-determination, was basically the next: 
where is a state, there is a people -which stood in a controversial relation with the 
universality of the principle. The process of decolonization, conducted abiding to the 
principle of uti possidetis, led instead to a situation in which it was even more manifest 
that the world was comprised of states hosting a plurisy of peoples, to which the right 
of self-determination would have to be equally granted. The fact that states could often 
be accused of realizing the self-determination project of a single national community 
-usually the majority group- over the others (through policies of cultural assimilation, 
denial of autonomy, etc.) forced the international community to somehow modify the 
application of self-determination. In the 70’s, the perception of a need to better gua-
rantee the rights of peoples led to a first departure from the precedent doctrine. In the 
1970 so-called Declaration on Friendly Relations, the reaffirmation of the principle of 
territorial integrity was followed by an important caveat, the so-called “safeguard clause”, 
which was apparently meant to limit the obligation of respecting the territorial integrity 
to ‘States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples [...] and thus possessed of a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour’.53
The 1970 safeguard clause was then re-framed and solemnly recalled in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993. After affirming the principle that peoples 
can take ‘any legitimate action, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
to realize their inalienable right to self-determination’ -whose denial would amount to 
a violation of human rights- it confirmed that a duty to respect the territorial integrity 
would apply for those states ‘possessed of a Government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinctions of any kind’.54 On the one hand, this 
caveat paved the way for the contemporary success of the remedial secession theory. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that the concrete application of the clause in 
international relations has proved to be rather difficult. In the few (national) sentences 
in which this principle has been recalled, the Courts ‘simply proceeded on the assump-
tion that the governments in question were representative’.55 On the other hand, as 
Vidmar explains, ‘[t]he territorial integrity limitation effectively divorces the right of 
self-determination from the notion of a right to secession, thus establishing a distinction 
between internal and external self-determination’.56 Provided that not only the task of 
defining a people is complicated, yet never fully clarified, but that in some cases it is 
even difficult to distinguish a people from an ethnic minority,57 it is evident the reason 
why the international community has actively advocated for the promotion of internal 
self-determination, as a way to avoid major territorial changes and subsequent threats 
to peace. This interpretation has left to states themselves the chance of accommoda-
ting claims to self-determination through internal arrangements (from recognition 
of cultural rights, to different models of autonomy, and up to different federal-type 
arrangements). 
While there is a considerable track of successful accommodation of self-determination 
conflicts, also in recent times,58 it is equally true that secessionism and separatism con-
tinued to have large following, often (but by no means always) as a response to state 
52. Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, A/
Res/1514 (XV), 14 December 
1960, para. 2.
53. Declaration on Principles 
of International Law, Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance 
With the Charter of the United 
Nations, A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 
October 1970.
54. United Nations World 
Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, UN Doc. A/
CONF.157/23 (1993), para. 2. 
55. Summers (2007), at 344.
56. Vidmar (2009), at 808.
57. Ibid. at 812.
58. Weller (2009).
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violence, past injustices, ineffective protection of minority rights, or denial of internal 
self-determination, that is, lack of government representativeness. Indeed, if anything is 
true, ‘Kosovo is not unique in becoming well-known for suffering the repressive actions 
of a parent state’.59 It is, instead, a clear example of how ‘[m]inorities appropriate the 
vocabulary of self-determination whether governments or scholars approve it or not’.60 
But the justification of secession on the basis of self-determination has been avoided 
under general international law by interpreting the provisions of self-determination as if 
they can hardly annul the customary norm of territorial integrity. As it will be clarified 
below, international law does not permit nor prohibit secession, ‘[y]et there is a clear 
bias against it’.61 Benedek contends that Kosovo could be one of the first cases in which 
the balance between sovereignty of states and sovereignty of peoples would be shifting 
towards the latter.62 While this could be surely considered a positive effect of the case, 
the validity of such assertion will have to be counter-checked in the medium period, 
together with the viability of the new state. At this stage, it seems still reasonable ‘to 
avoid avoiding the question of how Serbia lost its title simply by postulating a new status 
for Kosovo which requires (but does not explain) the termination of Serbia’s rights’.63 
In the following paragraphs, some of the legal grounds for asserting the independence 
of Kosovo will be examined, starting from its compatibility with Resolution 1244.
B. The institutional framework of Resolution 1244 
As it has been implied in precedence, from a legal standpoint, S/Res/1244 is the main 
obstacle to the independence of Kosovo. It is clear that the document in no place gave 
dispositions for the timing or the outcome of the status process. In this sense, it can be 
accepted that it neither provided nor excluded that Kosovo could achieve independen-
ce.64 On the one hand, such ambiguity favoured those international actors who decided 
to support the independence: since secession had not been explicitly banned, it was 
argued, the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo could also be freely recognized. 
On the other hand, the non-recognition party stresses that, according to the resolution, 
the final status had to be negotiated and in no case could be acceptable a unilateral 
modification to the status of Kosovo, in absence of Serbia’s consent at least. Common 
sense suggests that, despite the ambiguities, it is not possible to accept that a legal 
document -which had been previously agreed- can provide two mutually exclusive legal 
outcomes.65 Perhaps, in order not to incur in the political impasse experienced in the 
following negotiations, a surplus of good faith could have helped both the local parties 
and their international counterparts to find some sort of accommodation. Probably, 
more attention should have been posed to the procedural steps, in order to achieve a 
shared vision about the final status process. The crucial passage in this sense seems to be 
contained in the provisions of Annex 2, which prescribes in its opening that (empha-
sis mine) ‘Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a 
resolution of the Kosovo crisis’, one of those principles being (again, emphasis mine)
[a] political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account 
of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should 
not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.66
59. Goodwin (2007), at 1. 
This opinion is shared by 
Warbrick who states that ‘[t]
he repression of the Kosovars 
up to 1999 was pretty 
exceptional but by no means 
unique’. He further notices 
that, while a few Serbs were 
indicted before the ICTY for 
crimes against humanity and 
war crimes, ‘[i]t is notable that 
no Serb was indicted [...] for 
genocide in Kosovo’. Warbrick 
(2008), at 680. 
60. Thornberry (1989), at 
867-868. 
61. Slomanson (2009), at 11.
62. Benedek (2008), at 682.
63. Warbrick (2008), at 682. 
64. Borgen (2008).
65. Orakhelashvili holds 
that since Security Council 
Resolutions are “in substance 
agreements between states”, 
they should be assimilated 
to international treaties. In 
this sense they would be 
subject to the principles of 
interpretation provided in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Orakhelashvili 
(2008a), at 32.
66. S/Res/1244 (1999), Annex 
II, para. 8.
12© Instituto de la paz y los conflictos 2011













   






The locution “political process” does not seem to envisage unilateral solutions 
whatsoever. At the same time, it can be safely inferred that the negotiations did not 
anyhow disrupt the establishment of self-governing institutions. 
Someone has argued that the commitment to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was 
only contained in the preambular language, it was in other words envisaged just pro 
forma. However, the references to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia are repeated 
many times not just in S/Res/1244, but also in precedent SC resolutions, in the same 
Rambouillet Accords, up to Resolution 1785 (2007) which was expressly reaffirming 
the territorial integrity of all states created on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.67 
The fact that Resolution 1244 was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adds 
one more reason to doubt about the legality of a unilateral arrangement. Arguably, a 
change in Kosovo status -which is formally under an interim international administra-
tion- should be subject to a confirmation on the basis of a new SC Resolution; which is, 
of course, an eventuality that can still occur in the future, on the basis of an agreement 
on either the local or the international plane.
Robert Muharremi holds that ‘[i]f a resolution like Resolution 1244 is ambiguous and, 
as such, offers different possible interpretations, the interpretation that best ensures the 
compatibility of the resolution with international ius cogens must apply’.68 Therefore, he 
holds, if Kosovo Albanians are found to be qualifiable for external self-determination, 
‘Resolution 1244 must be construed in such a manner that it does not constitute a 
barrier to the exercise of such a right’; on the other hand, if they are not entitled to this 
right, the declaration of independence itself ‘would have to be declared in violation of 
international ius cogens.’69 Similarly, Enrico Milano considers that S/Res/1244 does not 
rule out the option of independence, which should have been, however, the result of a 
“political settlement”, rather than a unilateral act. But even if it is accepted that Kosovo 
Albanians are entitled to (external) self-determination, supporters of unilateral indepen-
dence should ‘prove that UN S/Res/1244 has contributed to an oppressive status quo, in 
which the basic rights of self-government of the people of Kosovo are grossly denied’; 
but the facts rather prove that under the current administration, it is the members of 
minorities which suffered from ‘isolation, acts of ethnic cleansing and intimidation’.70 
As it was mentioned, the new Constitution of Kosovo does not make any reference 
to S/Res/1244 nor UNMIK. In 2001 UNMIK’s Legal Office explicitly ruled out that 
the Assembly of Kosovo could adopt acts directed at determining Kosovo’s final sta-
tus; and in the same year, it recommitted to such undertaking in the UNMIK-FRY 
Common Document.71 However, since UNMIK is the ultimate authority in Kosovo, 
subject only to the SG, a charge of legal inconsistency -lacking a political will- would 
be opposed only in cases of serious and incontrovertible breaches of S/Res/1244. The 
SG has instead acknowledged that the new constitution has considerably compromised 
the legitimacy of UNMIK, which is now frequently put in question by the leaders of 
Kosovo.72 Some considered this as an implicit consent of the UN to the independen-
ce of Kosovo;73 a similar argument could be advanced about the SC impossibility to 
endorse the Ahtisaari Plan or annul the unilateral independence. Nonetheless, as it 
was stated in the ICJ Namibia advisory opinion, ‘[t]he fact that a particular proposal is 
not adopted by an international organ does not necessarily carry with it the inference 
that a collective pronouncement is made in a sense opposite to that proposed’.74 In 
such conditions, it seems however that S/Res/1244 -due to an internal split of the SC, 
67. S/Res/1785, 21 November 
2007, Preamble, para. 2.
68. Muharremi (2008) at 424.
69. Ibid.
70. Milano (2008) at 30-31.
71. Ibid., at 33.
72. Knoll (2009), at 382. 
73. Benedek (2008), at 403; 
similarly, Knoll (2009), at 395.
74. Legal Consequences for Sta-
tes of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), ICJ Reports 1971, 16 et 
seq. (36, para. 69).
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and to political events on the ground- even if still retaining legal validity, is lacking of 
concrete effectiveness. There is no need to be too pessimistic, but at the moment the 
UN-led post-conflict management has apparently failed to provide the framework for 
a stable, multilateral agreement. At this point it seems important to clarify the issue of 
self-determination with respect to the population of Kosovo.
C. Kosovo claims to statehood and self-determination
As it was recalled above, self-determination is firmly established in international law, 
and although its interpretation and application has been sensibly changing over time, it 
is now accepted as an obligation erga omnes.75 In cases like Kosovo, where the applica-
tion is unclear and can give rise to different interpretations, self-determination appears 
particularly controversial and gives rise to so-called “self-determination conflicts”.76 The 
question appears to be the following: do the Kosovo Albanians, i.e. the overwhelming 
majority of the population of Kosovo, qualify as a people for the purposes of self-
determination? In 2001, Helen Quane argued that Kosovo Albanians did not qualify 
as a people for the purposes of self-determination, not even in its internal form. She 
was basing her considerations on the fact that S/Res/1244 did not explicitly mention 
self-determination, nor it was making any reference to the “people” of Kosovo: the 
provisions for self-government, according to her, were to see as an expression of com-
mitment for the respect of minority rights. On this basis, she could conclude that ‘the 
international response to the Kosovo crisis [...] does little to extend the right to internal 
or external self-determination beyond the currently accepted beneficiaries of the right, 
namely, peoples organized as states and colonial peoples’.77 More recently, Orakhelas-
hvili has expressed positions substantially similar, stating that Kosovo is ‘an entity that 
claims statehood outside the colonial context and without the consent of the parent 
state. This [...] confirms that Kosovo is not an entity entitled to self-determination’.78 
Pierre D’Argent equally holds that -from the point of view of international law- it is 
“certain” that the people of Kosovo is not a people which qualifies for the right of self-
determination, and in fact, he claims, the UDI does not make any reference to such 
principle.79
On the other hand, it is clear that for those who back the independence Kosovo Alba-
nians constitute with little doubts a people entitled to self-determination, which can the-
refore take even its external form. Then a crucial question arises. Since Kosovo Albanians 
were before considered a national minority, when did they attain the status of “people”, 
for the purposes of self-determination? The proponents of this idea usually contend that 
Kosovo Albanians have become a “people” following to the Serbian disastrous policies of 
the 90’s, and possibly also in reason of the prolonged UN administration. The first jus-
tification alone would make the right of self-determination arguably assimilable to the 
doctrine of remedial secession -discussed in the next paragraph- therefore nullifying the 
distinction between internal and external self-determination. This is surely contradicted 
by practical and customary interpretations of the safeguard clause, as discussed above. 
And -if we have to judge by the recognizing statements- this is not even the intention of 
the supporters of the independence, which has repeatedly been purported as a unique or 
sui generis solution. Perhaps, then, the first point has to be seen in connection with the 
second, the UN prolonged administration. This idea does not seem to be solidly groun-
ded as well. First, in the context of the non consensual break-up of Yugoslavia, there 
is a precedent UN transitional administration mission of a break-away territory which 
75. Cf. East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia).
76. The claim to self-determi-
nation often encapsulates the 
hopes of ethnic peoples and 
other groups for freedom and 
independence. It provides a 
powerful focus for nationalist 
fervour, and it offers a con-
venient tool for ethnic entre-
preneurs seeking to mobilize 
populations and fighters in 
pursuit of a secessionist cause. 
Indeed, self-determination 
conflicts are among the most 
persistent and destructive 
forms of warfare’. Weller 
(2009), at 111. 
77. Quane (2000), at 227.
78. Orakhelashvili (2008a), 
at 11.
79. D’Argent (2008), at 3.
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was concluded with the return of the province to the legitimate sovereign.80 Secondly, 
as it has been contended, such justification could set a very dangerous precedent, which 
would (further) reduce the cooperation of states regarding the establishment of UN 
peace missions on territories with active secessionist movements.81
The argument of the prolonged duration of self-administration, is also not in itself a 
valid justification for earning (or losing) an entitlement to external self-determination, 
since it is clear that a meaningful, or more realistically wide degree of self-government 
would be bilaterally and internationally guaranteed to Kosovo. By the way, it should be 
recalled that UNMIK entered in Kosovo very clearly designed as an “interim” adminis-
tration. It was then agreed by all the parties that its mandate should not be limited by 
any restraint of time. Friedrich was prompting the idea that a right of secession could 
have been evolved from a right to internal self-determination.82 Kosovo would be the 
first case, Friedrich argues, of a ‘conditional right’ to independence, awarded on the pre-
mise of an extraordinary effort of the government to ensure human rights and protection 
of minorities. However, it seems evident that –apart from pledges of commitment on 
behalf of Kosovo leaders- remarkable advancements in the mentioned fields are far to 
be achieved. On the other hand, as Warbrick remarks, there has been no explicit sign 
of such a conditionality clause on behalf of the recognizing states.83 
Other commentators, sceptical about a right to independence based on a controversial 
right to self-determination, nonetheless admit that Kosovo Albanians, in view of their 
history, have matured a right to self-determination, which however would have to 
be enjoyed in its internal form. The position can be supported through the Badinter 
Opinion no.2, in which the Committee considered the Serbian population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia as peoples for the purposes of self-determination, but at the 
same time held that such right could not be exercised in its external form.84 Brown 
clarified such position holding that ‘[i]n practice, the principle of self-determination 
has never guaranteed an automatic right to statehood or other forms of external self-
determination’. While considering that Kosovo might fall in the case of a people ‘subject 
to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context’,85 he imme-
diately warned that ‘both the principle and its application to Kosovo are disputable’, 
and that the independence of Kosovo could better be defended on other bases.86 Vidmar 
similarly concluded that ‘[a]lthough Kosovo Albanians might qualify as a people for 
the purpose of the right of self-determination, the applicability of this right does not 
per se suggest that secession can be justified’.87 Two more considerations contribute to 
the solidity of this opinion. First, the fact that –as it was said- the UDI, while using the 
language of self-determination, does never openly mention it. Secondly, the fact that 
so far only two countries explicitly mentioned self-determination in their recognition 
statements.88 It seems therefore safe defending the opinion that even if we accept that 
Kosovo Albanians qualify as a people for the purposes of self-determination, the unila-
teral independence of Kosovo can not be regarded as legally grounded on the doctrine 
of self-determination. 
D. Remedial secession theory
The doctrine of remedial secession has been implicitly or explicitly invoked by a few 
scholars in relation to Kosovo, as the source of a legitimate claim to independence.89 
Arguments in favour of this interpretation can be derived from both the UDI and 
80. The mission UNTAES (UN 
Transitional Authority for 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Sirmium), established 
by S/Res/1037, was operative 
between 1996 and 1998. 
After two years the territories 
were re-conducted under the 
jurisdiction of Croatia. 
81. D’Argent (2008), at 10.
82. Friedrich (2005) at 251-
254.
83. Warbrick (2008), at 686.
84. Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitra-
tion Commission of the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia, 11 
January 1992, para. 4. Quoted 
in Jure Vidmar (2009), at 812.
85. Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, [1998] SCR, at 285. 
86. Brown (2005), at 251.
87. At the same time, 
however, he warns that under 
the current circumstances, 
a return of Kosovo to Serbia 
to which Kosovo itself did 
not consent ‘might violate 
the applicable right of self-
determination’. Vidmar (2009), 
at 814.
88. Afghanistan (18 February 
2008) and the United Arab 
Emirates (14 October 2008). 
89. Benedek (2008), at 398-
402; Pippan and Karl (2008).
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several recognition statements, although, again, no clear reference has been made in 
official statements. The acceptance of remedial secession arguments in international 
legal reasoning can be traced in the mentioned Declaration on Friendly Relations. Its 
success in academic circles –in the context of a wider moral reform of international 
law- dates back to the 70’s, and has sparked wide echo for its unquestionable ethical 
appealing, even though at the same time it seems mining a basic tenet of international 
order, namely, the principle of territorial integrity. Conceptually, there are two main 
problems arising from a translation of this theory into legal provisions. First, there is a 
feeling that –to be effective- remedial secession should be framed not merely as a liberty-
right, which seems to be relatively accepted in international relations,90 but rather as a 
claim-right, opposable to the community of states as such. The difficulties concerning 
such development are self-evident. Secondly, a question arises whether the right would 
apply retroactively or only to ongoing situations of serious human rights violations. 
Differently put, what if in the process of “enforcing” a secession, the remedial conditions 
disappear? Is the right still opposable nonetheless? 
It is also worth noticing that several formulations exist of such theory. One of the most 
influential proponents of the theory, Allen Buchanan, suggests that such a right should 
be ‘a remedy of last resort against a persistent pattern of serious injustices’.91 But e.g. 
Seymour contends to Buchanan that the ‘[t]he injustices do not merely relate to the 
violation of human rights, to the annexation of territories, or to the violation of previous 
intrastate autonomy arrangements, for they also stem from a failure to comply with 
principles such as fair representation and internal self-determination’.92 And Summers 
seems to follow this line when he proposes that the remedial theory would apply whe-
never a state ‘is unrepresentative and excludes or persecutes part of his population’.93 For 
such reasons, to what extent such theory is acceptable in international legal reasoning is 
disputable on the grounds of subjective perceptions. As an example, it can be noticed 
that while in 1978 Lee Buchheit could affirm that ‘remedial secession seems to occupy 
a status as the lex lata’,94  in 2008 Pierre D’Argent still maintains that the propositions 
of remedial secession have remained till now de lege ferenda.95
The availability of the interstate community to substantiate such principle has been 
comprehensibly low. Therefore, with respect to Kosovo, the majority of commentators 
-be they in favour, against, or neutral about the independence- has considered that 
the justification of secession on the remedial secession theory would suffer from both 
a lack of significant state practice and other conceptual bias to be specifically invoked. 
Hilpold, recalling the findings of the Supreme Court of Canada, recognizes that a right 
to remedial secession ‘has not yet materialized, even though there is a considerable 
support in academic writing for such a concept’.96 Milano, instead points to the fact 
that a recourse to the ethics of remedial secession should be discarded in consideration 
of the intention of framing the Kosovo case as no legal precedent (or at least as a case so 
special that it could hardly be invoked as a precedent in future cases). He further notices 
that ‘[e]ven assuming that the right to remedial secession has crystallised in internatio-
nal law, the very notion of “last resort” option does not seem to fit into the reality of 
contemporary Kosovo’.97 D’Argent similarly remarks that the sui generis label applied 
to the case of Kosovo makes such appeal to remedial secession less morally compelling. 
He also considers that the reality of Kosovo has substantially changed since the regime 
of Milošević, so that in this case secession does not appear to be a remedy anymore.98 
90. About the permissiveness 
of secession in international 
relations see below, Section III. 
91. Buchanan (2004), at 270.
92. Seymour (2007), at 395-
423.
93. Summers (2007), at 
343-344.
94. Buchheit (1978), at 222. 
95. D’Argent (2008), at 4. 
96. Hilpold (2009), at 56.
97. Milano (2008), at 26.
98. D’Argent (2008), at 4.
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Finally, Vidmar recalls the sentence re Secession Quebec, which considered that ‘when a 
people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination inter-
nally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession’.99 However, also according 
to him, apart from the lack of state practice, the measure of unilateral secession should 
be taken into consideration only as a last resort. The current situation in Kosovo instead 
does evidence that the violations of human rights have ended in reason of the NATO 
intervention and the subsequent UNMIK mission, and that at the moment Kosovo 
Albanians prospectively enjoy significant means of self-government, guaranteed by 
regional and international organizations. 
If one can share the opinion that ‘there must be no (further) realistic and effective 
remedies for the peaceful settlement of the conflict’ in order for the qualified secession 
doctrine to apply,100 then it is imperative to determine whether Kosovo falls in this 
category or not. Evidently, the opinions of the two parties will be -once more- diame-
trically opposed; there are nonetheless reasonable margins to argue that further attempts 
could have been made in order to opt out of a sterile zero-sum game. In view of these 
considerations, the claim to remedial secession results to some extent convincing but it 
is surely not an uncontroversial legal basis for the independence of Kosovo. Had it been 
more clearly articulated, it could have constituted a sort of cornerstone for the interstate 
regime of the 21st century. Instead, portraying as “unique” the secession of Kosovo 
on the basis of remedial theories risks to appear -to detractors of the independence at 
least, and paraphrasing Buchanan (who was by the way referring to the OAF)- ‘only 
the most recent of a series of illegal interventions for which cogent moral justifications 
could have been given’.101
E. International dispositive powers
A final argument which has found some support among legal scholars regards so-called 
international dispositive powers, i.e. the power of prominent international actors to 
impose permanent territorial changes to sovereign entities, or to carve from them new 
states altogether.102 According to Crawford, three options for such dispositive powers 
have been substantiated by relevant practice: a) by the way of multilateral treaties; b) 
through a show of collective recognition; c) through the exercise of international orga-
nizations.103 All of them could have been applied to the case of Kosovo. The first option 
could have been implemented by the way of a multilateral imposition of the Kosovo 
independence at the end of the 1999 hostilities, in reason of the FRY’s reiterated non 
compliance with the UN SC Resolutions and attempts of ethnically cleansing the pro-
vince. Several critics can be advanced with respect to such an imaginative scenario. In 
the first place, probably the FRY would have not withdrawn if aware of such an extreme 
design. Secondly, it could have triggered a major crisis between NATO and Russia. 
Thirdly, such option would have clearly constituted a power stance, not in line with 
general trends of international practice. On the other hand, at the time this option could 
have been regarded as a more logic conclusion to the humanitarian war than it is today 
endorsing the independence of Kosovo from... the UN international administration.
The last option would arguably vest the Security Council with the power of sanctioning 
the independence of Kosovo. In this case, the SC would act in relation to the broadest 
interpretation of Chapter VII provisions. However, as Knoll evidences, ‘[a]side from the 
political impasse in which the Security Council was locked on the issue, such a decision 
99. Reference re: Secession of 
Quebec [1998], 2 SCR. 217, 
para. 134.
100. Raič (2002), at 332.
101. Buchanan (2004), at 275.
102. Crawford (2006), at 
503-564. 
103. Ibid. 
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would have found no precedent in public international law’.104 He also maintains that 
the SC could not issue any Chapter VII provision without the trigger of a real threat 
to peace.105 Similarly, Goodwin is of the opinion that ‘[t]he extent to which imposing 
a permanent alteration of its borders upon a state without its consent is compatible 
with the provisions of international law, such as uti possidetis, is rather questionable’.106 
With respect to such an eventuality, Judge Fitzmaurice is usually quoted when in the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion explicitly ruled out that the SC could enforce permanent 
territorial changes on the territory of a member state.107 Considering the expanded com-
petences that the UN have assumed in the past recent years with respect to territorial 
administration,108 it can be argued that the SC could have had the power to convey 
such a measure. In such a case, as Muharremi remarks, the international consensus 
would also imply a less strict application of the traditional criteria for statehood, such 
as independence and effectiveness.109 Given the divisions in the Security Council itself, 
this remains a matter of scholarly speculation; it is still clear that such development 
would have highly widened the SC powers in post-conflict management of territories.110
Another, less mentioned option of the case, would have been deferring the issue to the 
UN General Assembly, under the provisions of S/Res/377 (1950), better known as 
Uniting for Peace. Crawford e.g. recognizes that ‘if the Assembly does not possess any 
broad dispositive powers under the Charter, it is not necessarily contrary to its “cons-
titutional structure” for such powers to be conferred on it’.111 This would have deman-
ded the whole interstate community to decide on the Kosovo case; which would have 
surely been an unprecedented solution, but it could have granted the process enhanced 
legitimacy deriving from a globally crafted solution. 
The option of collective recognition is what most closely follows the actual development 
of the Kosovo issue, where a consistent number of countries, provided that in internatio-
nal organs it is impossible to form a consensus, would act as having dispositive powers. 
On balance, this seems the best legal account of the independence of Kosovo, although 
it cannot be considered, of course, an undisputed formula for achieving statehood. First, 
it has to be recalled that the recognition of Kosovo seems to have a regional, rather 
than international basis;112 and while such “regional dispositive powers” could have 
some effective conflict resolution potential, their application should also possibly fit 
into a more consistent legal framework than an ad hoc basis. In second place, collective 
recognition in such cases of contested statehood should arguably be brought back to 
a constitutive recognition theory, which is not very popular in international relations. 
More and more options of seeking to justify the independence of Kosovo can be 
invoked, but all legal grounds seem to be at least questionable. To be more specific, as 
it has been contended, ‘the [legal] theories purporting to justify Kosovar independence 
are flawed in one major respect’, i.e., they ‘start by claiming that Kosovar independence 
is the solution, and continue by offering legal justifications to support this outcome.’113 
If that is the case, the question that we need to consider is the following: are we dea-
ling with a fait accompli? In fact, according to majority interpretations of international 
law, emerging states do not need to demonstrate their own statehood by gathering full 
international recognition. The next chapter thus starts by seeking to assess the extent 
to which Kosovo can be already deemed a state, by referring to the so called “criteria 
for statehood”.  
104. Knoll (2009), at 385.
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III. The secession of Kosovo between law and politics
A. Kosovo at the test of statehood criteria
The history, also the recent one, offers plenty of examples of solemn declarations of inde-
pendence which could not concretize what they were issued for, that is, the admission 
of the new entity as a full member of the interstate community. The criteria that tradi-
tionally new entities have been required to meet -in order to be universally recognized 
as an independent and sovereign state- were fixed in the 1933 Montevideo Convention 
on Rights and Duties of States; they are generally considered to respond to the principle 
of effectiveness. The Montevideo Convention set in its first article those characteristics 
which were deemed necessary for acquiring international personality. Namely, they are: 
a) a permanent population; b) defined territory; c) a government; d) capacity to enter 
into relations with other states.114 Traditionally, these requirements have always been 
considered in the process of state formation, while they were not disputed anymore 
later, even if the state had come to visibly lack of them.115
With respect to Kosovo, as most commentators recognize, the first two elements would 
not pose excessive problems: Kosovo has a permanent population, and its borders are 
historically defined. Although it does not have full control of its territory -the reference 
is to northern municipalities with a Serbian majority which still depend on Belgrade- in 
recent practice this has not been considered as a problem for statehood, as it was the 
case with Croatia in 1992. Instead the last criterion, as Vidmar notices, seems to be 
self-fulfilling: since Kosovo has already been recognized by a number of states, it has 
undoubtedly achieved the capacity of entering into relations with them; on the other 
hand, such capacity is clearly missing vis-à-vis those states that chose not to recognize 
it.116 The criterion of government -which has been labelled by Crawford as ‘the most 
important single criterion of statehood’,117 is the real sore point, in both its aspects of 
effectiveness and independence. As already noticed with regard to the international 
dispositive powers,118 Muharremi considers that, the requirement of effective govern-
ment might be less strict when the former sovereign has consented to the secession.119 
Arguably, in case of unilateral secessions, like Kosovo, its application should instead 
be more rigorous. 
As Milano holds, under the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Proposal, Kosovo is ‘formally and 
factually dependent from a group of states’ which constitute the International Steering 
Group, represented in Kosovo by the ICR, who is doted of the widest powers like adop-
ting or rejecting legislation and removing local officials and politicians.120 Such complete 
reliance on external sources of legitimation is echoed in the UDI,121 and confirmed in 
the Constitution of 15 June 2008.122 With respect to this, it has been claimed that the 
government of Kosovo undertook voluntary restrictions of its sovereign powers, a fact 
that arguably cannot affect statehood, as it was the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Howe-
ver, in the first place it should be noticed that this provision applies when the stateho-
od is not contested, which is not the case of Kosovo. In second place, the restrictions 
on sovereignty -envisaged in S/Res/1244 and in the Constitutional Framework- were 
adopted before Kosovo declared independence and they remained in vigour after that, 
which means that Kosovo ‘did not accept restrictions to independence voluntarily but 
in order to comply with the pre-existing legal arrangements governing its territory’.123
114. Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States, 26 December 
1933, 165 LNTS, 19, Art. 1. 
115. Vidmar here echoes 
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The anomalies of Kosovo include the uniqueness of a sovereign state in which the Cons-
titution is not the first source of law in the internal legal hierarchy. The Constitution 
in fact explicitly gives precedence to the Ahtisaari Settlement Proposal over all other 
legal provisions, therefore over the Constitution itself.124 Furthermore, as Muharremi 
notices, the institution of the ICR is not envisaged in any UN legal document (such as 
S/Res/1244 or the Secretary General plans for UNMIK reconfiguration), therefore the 
relationship between his office and Kosovo rests uniquely upon Kosovo’s consent. Such 
consent could be withdrawn at any time without any legal consequence, depriving the 
ICR of the functions assigned to him under the Ahtisaari Settlement Proposal.125 It is 
possible to argue that Kosovo has obliged itself through the Constitution, however the 
fact remains that “there is no discrete international law source of these obligations”.126 
The criterion of effective government is questionable also on the internal plane. Without 
entering into detail, doubts arise in relation to a number of sectors of capital importance 
for the correct functioning of an independent state, like democracy, human rights and 
protection of minorities, the judicial system, internal order, economic viability. 
Since the state system moved from an international order based on effectiveness to one 
which is increasingly based on legitimacy,127 besides the traditional criteria for statehood 
in recent times additional criteria have been spelled out to determine whether or when 
an entity ought to be recognized as a state. The most influential document in this sense 
was the 1992 European Community Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. While these guidelines, for the 
precise historical and geographical context in which they were issued, cannot be consi-
dered to reflect international custom,128 they seem to be conveniently applicable to the 
case of Kosovo. The guidelines indicated the respect for the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris ‘especially 
with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights’, and guarantees of ‘the 
rights of the ethnic and national groups and minorities’. As mentioned, the effective 
respect of such guarantees in present-day Kosovo has to be regarded at least with sus-
picion. Furthermore, the guidelines requested the ‘respect of the inviolability of all 
frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement’, 
and ‘commitment to settle by agreement [...] all questions concerning State succession 
and regional disputes’.129 In this case, these provisions for conditional recognition appear 
to have been completely disregarded, not only and not much by the authorities of 
Kosovo, but by the recognizing states themselves. In the words of Delahunty and Perez 
‘no one could plausibly claim that, by recognizing Kosovo, the Western powers were 
merely acknowledging the existence of an accomplished reality - [...] the Western powers 
were plainly attempting to conjure the secessionist state of Kosovo into existence.’130 
Pragmatism induces to think that there is no way back from this unilateral step, but 
whatever its future, at the moment  Kosovo appears to be more a “work in progress”, 
a state-building project of part of the international community, than a sovereign and 
independent state which is being denied full international personality because of the 
negative stance of a few, stubborn UN members. 
B. Unilateral independence and collective recognition: dealing with a fait accompli?
After remarking that the independence of Kosovo did not proceed from the exercise of 
a right, Pierre D’Argent was asking whether such circumstance prevented Kosovo to 
achieve, nonetheless, statehood.131 The answer should apparently be in the negative. The 
124. Constitution of the Repu-
blic of Kosova, Art. 143 (2).
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simple fact that uncontested legal means to attain independence could not be opposed, 
does not imply that a unilateral secession cannot be successful in achieving statehood. 
As Milano explains
the act of secession may be originally illegal, yet international law may come to 
accept the originally unlawful situation through prescription, recognition and 
acquiescence, when the putative state is fully effective and independent and acts in 
conformity with international standards in the field of human rights and rights of 
minorities so to acquire international legitimacy.132
It is common speech that general international law is neutral with respect to secession, 
that is to say, law is unable to declare a secession legal or illegal, even though it has to 
acknowledge the facts resulting from a secession. This opinion is rather consolidated, 
notwithstanding the fact that the interstate community has sought by all means to 
conjure unwanted detachments of territory, so that the respect of territorial integrity 
has been considered -in customary international practice- an obligation erga omnes. 
D’Argent explains the rationale of such “forgetfulness” under the following, subtle 
line of reasoning: should states -which so far remain the most prominent subjects (and 
makers) of international law- explicitly forbid minorities to secede, they would somehow 
contribute to objectify their very personality, which in turn could leave them more space 
to advance a secessionist bid; that is to say, forbidding is admitting an eventuality which 
states do not even want to consider.133 A meaningful rejection of this interpretation is 
provided by Orakhelashvili, who maintains that international law explicitly rules out 
unilateral secession as a way of achieving (legitimate) statehood.134 This approach privi-
leges lawfulness over effectiveness, which was the dominant paradigm in the pre-1945 
period; at this regard, Crawford’s comment is worth of mention: 
Since 1945 the international community has been extremely reluctant to accept 
unilateral secession of parts of independent States if the secession is opposed by the 
government of that State. [...] Since 1945 no State which has been created by unilat-
eral secession has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes 
of the government of the predecessor State. By contrast there are many examples 
of failed attempts at unilateral secession, including cases where the seceding entity 
maintained de facto independence for some time.135
The fact that Serbia upholds to the principle of territorial integrity -and more impor-
tantly, that is solidly backed by a permanent member of the Security Council- will then 
make hard for Kosovo and its supporters the way for definitive statehood, including 
the admission to the United Nations. Thus, while on the one hand the programmed 
UDI was a sort of ‘shot in the dark’,136 on the other hand it was a carefully planned 
act, which sought to evidence the fact that Kosovo’s bid for statehood can count with a 
large number of supporting states. As Ahtisaari dared to notice ‘It really doesn’t matter 
if Paraguay hasn’t recognised. Well over 65% of the wealth of the world has recognised. 
That matters.’137 Without going as far as undermining the idea of sovereign equality 
of international actors, the large number of recognitions cannot be, of course, under-
estimated. But however important the external recognition, the political nature of this 
power stance results more and more evident. 
The foreign diplomatic efforts and the stream of recognitions –which was not explicitly 
portrayed as a decision of collective recognition- were all arguably aimed at cementing 
the irreversibility of the independence of Kosovo without having to negotiate with a 
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large part of the international community contrary to this solution. Recognition, in 
particular, once accorded can be hardly withdrawn, and in this sense there seems to 
be really little way back. Being things as they are, at the moment it is just possible to 
admit that international law remains somehow lame on this subject, which is still very 
much regulated through international power politics. In this lays the importance of the 
imminent ICJ advisory opinion: it will undoubtedly constitute one of the most impor-
tant international legal documents coping with the fundamental issue of admission of 
new entities to the interstate community. 
C. The political grounds of the independence of Kosovo 
In the previous pages, a case has been made that the justifications for the independence 
of Kosovo cannot be grounded on a very persuasive legal basis. It has been also ack-
nowledged that the issue of state creation, as other highly sensible matters of interna-
tional relations, rests upon a swinging balance of legal and political arguments. It was 
contention of this article that in the singular case of Kosovo, the justifications for a 
collective state creation - even when mantled under “legalese” speech- have seemingly 
to be sought in more genuine political reasoning. This is not necessarily detrimental to 
the cause of an independent Kosovo, since it is arguable that political reasoning leaves 
more space to defend such option than a strict legal reasoning would; such one-sided 
development is instead detrimental to the idea that international law -as it is framed 
today- serves the cause of international peace and security. Discussing in detail the 
political dimension of the status settlement evidently lies outside of the purposes of this 
paper; however, in order to illustrate some partial conclusions, a few considerations are 
worth of notice. The main political argumentations for the opportunity of recognizing 
Kosovo can be inferred by the recognition statements themselves. Mostly, the indepen-
dence solution is claimed to be the best political option in view of either the ‘prospect 
of peace and security in the Balkan region’, the ‘failed negotiations between Pristina and 
Serbia’, or ‘the claim that Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case, i.e., a class of its own’.138
The first point encompasses a set of delicate regional issues, especially in light of the 
common place that the stability of Europe relies on the stability of the Balkans. Firstly, 
as Goodwin puts it, ‘[t]o accept that the failure to achieve independence will cause the 
majority Kosovar-Albanians to express their displeasure by violent means and thereby 
undermine international peace and security is to accept a form of blackmail that the 
Security Council should arguably not seek to encourage’.139 Secondly, the security of 
Kosovo will have to be granted, still for a long time, by a considerable international 
military and civilian presence: the price of such international supervised independence 
is for the Albanian community a surrogate of sovereignty and self-determination, and 
for the EU, a complex, costly, and long-lasting mission of institution-building. With 
the result that any false step in this mechanism is capable of turning the country (and 
the region) into a powder keg. In third place, it is a fact that carving a new ethnic state 
in the Balkans does little or nothing for the reconciliation process. Finally, one has at 
least to notice that the stability of Kosovo achieved through unilateral independence 
might signify new troubles for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it resulted evident140 in the 
course of 2010.
The point of the failed negotiations is, at best, a matter of perspectives. By the moment 
that the project of an independent Kosovo was endorsed ‘even while final status nego-
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tiations were still ongoing’,141 there are strong reasons –despite the solemn proclaims 
contained in the UDI- to doubt of a genuine good faith on behalf of the Albanian 
negotiators. There is also ground to reject the idea that the commitment of the Contact 
Group to respecting “the will of the Kosovo population” should be interpreted as if the 
Albanian community could actually decide autonomously about its future status. Would 
it be so, the reasons of holding a negotiation process would have lost all significance. But 
if at worst Albanians would have to be entitled to a full exercise of self-determination, 
this should have probably better been implemented by the way of a popular consultation 
with different status options (full independence, free association, enhanced confederate 
status, partition on the de facto line, union with Albania, etc.). 
Finally, there is the sui generis argument, that is to say, the argument of the uniqueness 
of Kosovo. One should remind that the same Western countries that throughout the 
90’s (and beyond) ‘adamantly insisted that the former internal administrative borders of 
Yugoslavia were sacrosanct and could not be breached, no matter how compelling the 
demands for their revision’,142 have suddenly decided to pursue and advocate for a policy 
which apparently nullifies years of political, legal, diplomatic and military efforts in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, together with Bruno Coppieters, 
one has to recognize that ‘[i]t is intriguing in itself to learn why the EU keeps talking 
about a unique case and not about an exceptional case. A simple answer is that unique 
cases do not refer to general principles, whereas exceptions do.’ Thus the independence 
of Kosovo should have been portrayed as ‘exceptional but not unique’.143
With regard to this process there are two considerations to do, which share a common 
premise. The premise is that –honestly speaking- one cannot completely exclude that 
independence was the only viable solution for Kosovo, since it might be true that the 
Kosovo case comprised a constellation of facts unlikely to repeat.144 But besides proce-
dural doubts, we still have to acknowledge that, first, there may be other cases in which 
secession might be the only viable solution, be it on legal or political grounds, through 
enforcement, supervision or other ways of implementation. There might be cases, in the 
contemporary international stage, in which independence might be more clearly suited 
as a claim-right than it was in Kosovo. Secondly, in view of this first point, single features 
of the case of Kosovo -which is arguably compounded of several “anomalies”- can be 
recalled in the future (actually, they have already been recalled) for either legitimate or 
illegitimate secessionist movements to push for “Kosovo-like” solutions. In other words 
-as it has been suggested in other parts of this paper- coupling arguments of remedial 
secession and uniqueness has contributed only to greater confusion in this field, while it 
has not made much -on the one hand- to diminish the appeal of secession for disconten-
ted minorities, and -on the other hand- to diminish the likelihood that powerful states 
or coalitions can foster or endorse secession in case of perceived political opportunity.
This brings us to a final class of considerations. This particular attitude to power politics 
on the global stage is generally known under the name of geopolitics. At the beginning 
of the 90’s, the world just got over one of the biggest geopolitical clashes -the Cold 
War- to enter a period which eventually proved to be more insidious and not at all 
more peaceful. The renewed opposition between Western countries and Russia -in 
which the issue of Kosovo played all but a marginal role- might be the aftermath of 
the Cold War, or might be the sign of a new, different geopolitical strain. For sure, the 
Russian intervention in Georgian internal situation has given a following to the fight 
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over recognition of new, friendly statelets. The harm has to be envisaged on two distinct 
planes. The first obliges to recognize that this sort of geopolitical wrestling –which 
follows the pattern of Cold War’s proxy conflicts-145 stirs up trouble in those regions 
where local secessionist sentiments can be fuelled to destabilize the opponent’s interests. 
Evidently, the negative effects of such “proxy secessions” rest –above all- on the local 
populations. The second proceeds from the lack of diplomatic capacity of prominent 
international actors to reach a consensus, especially in the framework of the Security 
Council, about sensible matters of international security. The ineffective functioning 
or the sidestepping of this organ evidently threatens the whole United Nations, which 
is still the most important organ deputed to international peace. 
In sum, the independence of Kosovo –as any externally sponsored secession- apparently 
found its chance of being in reason of the ‘conflicting legitimacy’ of international law 
and geopolitics.146 In an interstice of these  seemingly relies the chance of a community 
to constitute itself as a sovereign state. Crawford holds that ‘the creation of States is 
a matter in principle governed by international law and not left to the discretion of 
individual States’.147 In light of the facts, however, this appears to be more of a principle 
than a normative disposition, while at the same time it is incontestable that ‘[s]ecession 
has now become today the principal way of gaining independent statehood’.148 It is 
therefore to share the opinion of who considers that the most prominent sponsors of 
“proxy secessions” (namely, USA and Russia) ‘would better serve their national interests 
if they were to prod the UN membership into negotiating a global multilateral treaty 
on secession’.149
Is this a conclusion? 
This article has examined the historical, legal and political developments that are con-
ducing Kosovo on the way to statehood. An analysis of the legal issues arising from the 
recent declaration of independence has revealed that there is hardly a right for Kosovo 
Albanians to their own state. Some credit has been awarded to remedial secession 
doctrines, which had however to be combined with a step of collective recognition as 
a way of conveying international dispositive powers. Such explanation is not, however, 
uniformly interpretable as a sound legal basis to justify what -however seen- remains a 
unilateral secession. On these premises, it has been contended that external recognition 
has occurred on political, rather than legal grounds. While the validity of such solution 
could not be fully assessed, the opportunity of conveying such a measure as a one-sided 
solution has been deemed rather poor. The international disagreement keeps maintai-
ning Kosovo at the heart of a geopolitical wrestling which, above all, is detrimental 
to the credibility and the effectiveness of the United Nations. In addition, it has to be 
acknowledged that recognition and non recognition might respond to political and 
geopolitical opportunities which are probably not to be considered in the best interest 
of the local population. To put it differently, recognition based on a label of uniqueness 
and non recognition based on anachronistic arguments of territorial integrity are to 
be looked with suspicion, in that both might be blocking the advancement of peoples’ 
and group rights. 
On these premises, it has been decidedly criticized the rationale of supporting such 
unilateral solution on the basis of a purported uniqueness of the Kosovo case. As it was 
suggested, while a number of peculiar (and anomalous) events have effectively concurred 
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in its history, its precedent effect cannot be excluded a priori. In particular, a concrete 
risk is envisaged that single features of the Kosovo case are going to be employed in 
support of further, more or less legitimate attempts of secession. While, at the same 
time, the uniqueness clause significantly reduces any appeal of supporting the secession 
of Kosovo as based on remedial arguments. Contrarily to the opinion of Mr. Ahtisaari, 
who was sententiously arguing that ‘the Kosovo status has been resolved, and today we 
have a functional independent state of Kosovo’,150 the question of the status has ente-
red a new legal limbo, while the functionality of Kosovo as an independent state will 
remain a matter of speculation for a decade at least. Lacking still effective independence 
and being still –formally and factually- an internationally administered territory such 
‘dependent independence’ –as Garton Ash argued- might really be the best option for 
Kosovo.151 However, for the moment Kosovo keeps being, at best, a state in statu nas-
cendi, whose viability relies entirely on external support, and whose name dramatically 
recalls the spectres of endless ethno-national fragmentation.
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